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Prime Minister Theresa May is attending her final European Union (EU) Summit before the Article 50 negotiations are 
triggered, almost nine months after the referendum vote. The perceived wisdom is that the proceeding by which United 
Kingdom (UK) will leave the EU will take at least the two years specified in the EU Treaties, with some arguing that this 
period might have to be extended (which would need to be decided unanimously by the EU27), given the sheer difficulty 
and scope of issues that will need to be resolved. However, such an extension seems rather unlikely in light of the required 
unanimity, unless it is a purely technical provision to allow for the ratification of a deal already reached or to conclude on 
some of the finer details. 
 
The imminent negotiations will focus on the withdrawal process, only taking account of the framework for the leaving 
country’s future relationship with the Union. They are not intended, nor is it possible within this timeframe, to pre-negotiate a 
future trade and investment deal. Such a deal will take a number of years to conclude and the negotiations can only start in 
earnest after the UK has left the EU. But for many, there is at least hope that some kind of transitional deal can be found to 
bridge the time between withdrawal and the future deal. 
 
Towards a trade deal? 
 
What is clear is that the long-term deal will not be a soft Brexit – i.e. the UK remaining within the single market and/or the 
customs union. The red lines of the UK government, in particular concerning the freedom of movement of people and the 
role of European law and the European Court of Justice, made it impossible to strike a deal modelled after EFTA/EEA 
membership. In the end, it was the UK government that reached this conclusion, making it clear that it will be a hard Brexit, 
or, as dubbed by Theresa May, a clean Brexit. 
 
So now there is clarity about the UK’s position on the single market and the customs union, and, by implication, an 
indication of what the long-term desired outcome is from the UK perspective: a comprehensive deal that minimises the 
impact on the trade and investment flows between the UK and the EU while at the same time enabling Great Britain to be 
selective regarding in-migration and strike trade deals with the rest of the world. 
 
It remains to be seen how likely such a trade deal will be. Any such deal would have to meet the interests of the EU27, as 
well as satisfy the European Parliament, which will probably react unfavourably to any mercantilist behaviour, for example 
with regard to corporate tax. But before both sides can even enter these negotiations there will have to be a successful 
conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. 
 
First things first 
 
With respect to the withdrawal, London’s expectations and demands are still highly unclear. The UK government’s White 
Paper said little about this crucial first step in the process. The overall indications are contradictory: while the government 
has repeatedly noted the need to avoid going over a cliff’s edge, the White Paper also emphasises that no deal is better 
than a bad deal. The Article 50 notification could give an indication of what the direction of travel is going to be: will there be 
a sign of willingness to compromise or unreasonable demands that cannot be met by the 27? 
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There will be a number of tricky issues in the Article 50 negotiations, including, for example, the question of UK benefits for 
EU citizens. A big hurdle will be the legacy payments the EU is going to demand from the UK. While estimates vary, it will 
certainly be a significant amount. This is anathema to the Brexiteers in the British government and will certainly prompt a 
reaction in the Eurosceptic tabloid press. So far, at best, this payment has been portrayed in the British debate as the price 
the UK will have to pay for continued market access. But given the sequencing of the negotiations, this is unlikely to remain 
a convincing argument. In addition, the conclusion of the House of Lords Committee that there is no obligation for the UK to 
pay will most likely result in a hardening line on any divorce payments. 
 
From a negotiation perspective, reaching a withdrawal deal without any payment is highly unlikely. After all, the EU will not 
simply scrap its demands in the face of UK opposition. But without a withdrawal deal, there is little chance of transition 
arrangements or a long-term trade deal. This will add fuel to the arguments of those in the UK who believe that a quick exit 
will be better in any case: if you can’t reach a long-term deal, better to strive out on your own now to be able to conclude 
trade deals with other countries. 
 
In addition, there might be a domestic reason why Brexfast is desirable. The Scottish government is adamantly opposed to 
a hard Brexit and an independence referendum could happen as early as autumn 2018. Leaving the EU before such a 
referendum might make it harder for the Scots to vote to leave the United Kingdom into a more uncertain waiting stage for 
EU membership. 
 
Consequences of a breakdown 
 
There is thus a significant risk that there will be a breakdown in the withdrawal negotiations, driven by UK domestic political 
considerations. This would economically be highly detrimental for Great Britain, with companies bearing the brunt of the 
immediate consequences, and with significant litigation in both UK and EU Courts. There could be global financial 
turbulences as a result and the UK’s credibility as signatory to international treaties would also be undermined, jeopardising 
its ability to reach trade deals with third countries.  
 
There would also be a significant cost to the EU. Uncertainty, including legal uncertainty, would affect the workings of the 
EU. In addition, an immediate cessation of UK budgetary payments would create financial difficulties, which would also 
necessitate budget negotiations. But a messy Brexfast would also have a positive effect: it would pull the EU27 closer 
together and provide an example to avoid for Europe’s populists. 
 
While there are domestic UK reasons which will potentially increase the risk of a breakdown in the withdrawal negotiations, 
the big remaining question is what Theresa May is willing to do to avoid going over this cliff. There might well be a real 
appreciation of the costs such a step could entail. But given the UK government’s focus on keeping the Conservative Party 
together and winning the next election, domestic politics might override economic reasoning. At the very least, we need to 
start contingency planning for how to deal with the real possibility of a messy Brexfast. 
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